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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
EDWIN B. GIVAN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.FRANK LAMBETH, sometimes known as
FRANK R. LAMBETH, an unmarried man ;
NORMAN W. ESMEIER and CORRINE L.
ESMEIER, his wife; T. THALLO LAMBETH
and MRS. T. 'THALLO LAMBETH, his wife;
KEITH B. LAMBETH and MRS. KEITH B.
LAMBETH, his wife; ELLIS B. LAMBETH
and MRS. ELLIS B. LAMBETH, his wife:
AUBRA B. LAMBETH and MRS. AUBRA B.
LAMBETH, hi's wife; RAMON A S. WOOLSEY, and LA RAE B. LAMBETH,
Defendants and Respondents.
BERTRAND 'T. GIVAN, INA GIVAN and
HELEN GIVAN,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
-vs.FRANK LAMBETH, sometimes known as
FRANK R. LAMBETH, un unmarried man;
and NORMAN W. ESMEIER,
Third Party Defendant.c;.

No. 8955

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
The defendants have little quarrel with plaintiffs'
statement of the nature of the case, agreeing with that
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statement except for the feeling that it must be set forth
that both by the law and the instructions of the court the
findings of the jury in the case were advisory only.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts made by the plaintiff is also
fair as far as it goes, with the exception of several instances we feel to be in error, these portions will be
pointed out in this statement of facts augmenting that
of the plaintiff.
With regard to the corrections:
1. On page 7, line 16, of plaintiff's brief, it indicates
that Pacific Finance Company on June 19, 1953 had taken
a judgment against Givans, Inc., for approximately
$10,000.00, referring to Exhibit 16. Exhibit 16 as part
of the record shows that the $10,000.00 judgment was
entered by Farn1ers State Bank on Septen1ber 25, 1953.
Further, this judgment arose from the residue of the obligation to Farmers State Bank in the sum of $12,000.00
which was contained in the obligations of Givans, Inc.,
and set forth in the agree1nent at the ti1ne defendants
purchased the corporate 8tock.
2. With regard to manual delivery of the deeds,
Keith Lambeth places the tilne in July, 1952 (T. 415).
3. The $13,700.00 nwrtgage to Pacific Finance was
given for consideration which would increase the assets
of Givans, Inc. equally with the increase in the liabilities
(plaintiff's brief, page 9).
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4. The mortgage given to L. C. Miles on July 1,
1953, was a renewal of a debt set forth in the stock sale
agreement of January 6, 1953.
5. Each of the Exhibits 7, 8, and 9 (the three deeds),
and Exhibit 10 (the bill of sale) were executed by Frank
Lambeth on August 1, 1950, and were manually delivered
to Keith Lambeth in the summer of 1952.
FURTHER STATEMENT OF FACTS BY
DEFENDANTS
The youngest of the Lambeth boys, Aubra, attained
his majority in 1942 (T. 180). All of the boys worked
for the sheep operation from 1934 to and including 1952
and never drew full wages (T. 401-502).
With regard to the solvency of Frank Lambeth at
the time of executing the bill of sale and deeds in August,
1950, Frank had no obligations not secured by property.
At the time of the delivery of the deeds in the summer
of 1952, he had no obligations not secured by property.
On May 18, 1953, when the deeds and bill of sale were
recorded, Frank Lambeth was indebted jointly and
severally with Norman Esmeier to the Givan brothers
for the four notes set forth in plaintiff's complaint, two
being payable at $72.61 per month and two being payable
November 30, 1953, with a sixty-day grace period. These
notes were secured by recourse to all the corporate stock
held by Lambeth and Esmeier consisting of 1980 of the
2,000 shares issued (addendum Exhibit 28).
The court held in its findings of fact on the first
part of the trial that the defendants took over the busi-
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ness and its assets rather than the stock (R. 60). The
court further found that the assets of the corporation
on February 18, 1953, were in excess of $100,000.00 (R.
58). Concerning the value of the assets of Givans, Inc.
in February, 1953, Bertrand Givan testified that the
building was worth $70,000.00, the ground $20,000.00 to
$25,000.00, used cars $10,000.00, tools and equipment
$15,000.00 to $18,000.00, and stock between $15,000.00 and
$20,000.00 (T. 107-108), or a total value computed from
his lowest figure of $130,000.00, besides notes and accounts receivable in the sum of $13,000.00 to $14,000.00
(T. 108).
Edwin Givan testified that in February, 1953, th~
garage building was worth $70,000.00, the ground $20,000.00 ( T. 137), parts $14,000.00 to $18,000.00, equipment
and tools $15,000.00, oil and grease $1,000.00 to $1,500.00
(T. 138), used cars $10,000.00, furniture and fixtures
$5,000.00, and accounts and notes receivable $8,000.00 to
$10,000.00, or a total at his lowest figures of $143,000.00
worth of assets (T. 139). The liabilities at this time were
set forth in the agreements between the parties and
totaled $57,850.00.
There is no showing of an increase or decrease in the
assets of the corporation between the date of sale and the
date of recording the deeds and bill of sale, Exhibits 3,
7, 8, 9, and 10, with the exception of a $13,700.00 n1ortgage
to Pacific Finance on l\Ia~r 1~, 1953 (Exhibit 13), which
was for value received and would 1nake no difference in
the solvency of the corporation as it shows an equal increase in assets and liabilities.
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Frank Lambeth has a monthly income for life independent of the sheep business and the garage business
in the sum of $146.00 per month (T. 307-308).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1.
THE COURT WAS NOT IN ERROR IN ITS FINDINGS
AS 1TO THE SOLVENCY OF FRANK LAMBETH ON MAY
18, 1953, AND IN FINDING THAT THE TRANSFER OF THE
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY, WHETHER AT THAT
TIME OR UPON MANUAL DELIVERY IN 'THE SUMMER
OF 1952, WAS NOT IN FRAUD OF CREDITORS.
(a) THE BURDEN OF SHOWING INSOLVENCY IS
ON THE PLAINTIFF AND THE EVIDENCE SHOWS LAMBETH TO HAVE BEEN SOLVENT ON AUGUST 1, 1950
WHEN 'THE DEEDS WERE EXECUTED; IN THE SUMMER
OF 1952 WHEN THE DEEDS AND BILL OF SALE WERE
DELIVERED; IN MAY, 1953, WHEN THE DOCUMENTS
WERE RECORDED, AS SOLVENCY IS DEFINED IN 25-1-2,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.

(b) THERE IS A WEALTH OF EVIDENCE OF CONSIDERA1TION FOR THE TRANSFER OF THE REAL ESTATE AND SHEEP OPERATION REPRESENTED BY EXHIBITS 7, 8, 9 AND 10.
(c) THE
TRANSFER BEING PRIOR TO 'THE
TIME THE GIVANS BECAME CREDITORS OF LAMBETH,
A SHOWING OF ACTUAL INTENT TO DEFRAUD IS NECESSARY WHETHER THE TRANSFER WAS FOR FAIR
CONSIDERATION OR, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS VOLUNTARY.

(d) 'THE DELIVERY IN THE SUMMER OF 1952 DOES
NOT SHOW AN INTENT ON THE PART OF FRANK LAM_
BETH TO DIVEST HIMSELF OF HIS PROPERTY IMMEDIATELY BEFORE ENTERING INTO A SUBSTANTIAL
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BUSINESS IN WHICH HE CONTEMPLATED CONTRACTING DEBTS BEYOND HIS ABILITY TO PAY.
(e)

BADGES OF FRAUD.

(f and g) THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTION THAT FRANK LAMBETH RETAINED THE LAND OR GOODS IN HIS POSSESSION OR
UNDER HIS CONTROL.

(h) 'THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE
CREATION OF A TRUST FOR FRANK LAMBETH.
POINTS 2. and 3.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7 OF THE JUDGMENT.
POINTS 4, 5, and 6.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUSTAINING DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION 'TO PROFFERED EXHIBITS 13, 14, 15,
AND THE DEPOSITION OF THE WITNESS SCOVILLE.
POINT 7.
THERE IS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S F AlLURE TO
ADMIT FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE JURY EVIDENCE CONSISTING OF THE LAMBETHS' CHECKING
ACCOUNT FROM JUNE 1952 TO AND INCLUDING AUGUST
1953.
POINT 8.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
ARGF~IE~T

POINT 1.
THE COURT WAS NOT IN ERROR IN ITS FINDINGS
AS 'TO THE SOLVENCY OF FRANK LAMBETH ON MAY
18, 1953, AND IN FINDING THAT THE TRANSFER OF THE
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY, WHETHER AT THAT
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TIME OR UPON MANUAL DELIVERY IN 'THE SUMMER
OF 1952, WAS NOT IN FRAUD OF CREDITORS.
(a) THE BURDEN OF SHOWING INSOLVENCY IS
ON THE PLAINTIFF AND THE EVIDENCE SHOWS LAMBETH TO HAVE BEEN SOLVENT ON AUGUST 1, 1950
WHEN THE DEEDS WERE EXECUTED; IN THE SUMMER
OF 1952 WHEN THE DEEDS AND BILL OF SALE WERE
DELIVERED; IN MAY, 1953, WHEN THE DOCUMENTS
WERE RECORDED, AS SOLVENCY IS DEFINED IN 25-1-2,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
1

25-1-2 "INSOLVENCY. - A person is insolvent when the present fair salable value of
his assets is less than the amount that will be required to satisfy his probable liability on his
existing debts as they become absolute and matured.
"In determining whether a partnership is insolvent there shall be added to the partnership
property the present fair salable value of the
separate assets of each general partner in excess
of the amount probably sufficient to meet the
claims of his separate creditors, and also the
amount of any unpaid subscription to the partnership of each limited partner; provided, the present
fair salable value of the assets of such limited
partner is probably sufficient to pay his debts,
including such unpaid subscription."
Frank Lambeth and Norman Esmeier entered into
a joint enterprise for the purchase of all but 20 shares of
Givans, Inc. stock by an agreement dated January 6, 1953
(R. 20-22) and an addendum to that agreement dated
February 18, 1953 (R. 23) for the purchase price of
$50,400.00 (T. 3), of which $16,000.00 was paid in cash
by Lambeth and the balance to be paid by four notes as
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set forth in the plaintiff's complaint. The sellers expressly retained full recourse to the stock to secure the notes,
a statement regarding recourse being found in the addendum (R. 23). The assets of the corporation were
found by the court to be in excess of $100,000.00 (Finding 7, R. 58). This finding, prepared by the plaintiff,
was based on the testimony of the plaintiff Edwin Givan
and his brother Bertrand Givan, who had been up to that
time president and vice president, respectively, of Givans,
Inc.
Edwin, testifying as to the value of the assets of
the corporation in February, 1953, testified to a minimum
value of $143,000.00, including value of the building and
grounds at $90,000.00 to $95,000.00 (T. 137-139). The
minimum figure from Bertrand's testimony (T. 107-109)
was $131,000.00, including $90,000.00 to $95,000.00 for the
building and grounds and not including the notes or
accounts receivable. The liabilities of the corporation
were set forth in the sale agreen1ent between the parties
to this lawsuit as $57,850.00.
The interests of both Esn1eier and Lmnbeth in the
stock of the corporation is jointly attributable to the
payment of the $34,500.00 \Yorth of notes due to the
Givans for determining the question of solvency of either,
under the second paragraph of :25-1-:2. rC~l. 1953, supra.
There is no showing of a substantial fluctuation in
the value of the assets of Givans, Inc. between February
18, and May 18, 1953, when the deeds and bill of sale in
eontroversy were recorded. There is not a scintilla of
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evidence regarding the diminution value of the ground
and building valued by plaintiff's own testimony at $90,000.00 to $95,000.00. The same fixtures and equipment
were there with only three months' depreciation and the
only evidence regarding the parts inventory is Frank
Lambeth's statement on examination by plaintiff's counsel that the assets were greater on May 18, 1953 than on
February 18, 1953 (T. 239-242).
Plaintiff makes much of the court's refusal to admit
pleadings and files foreign to this suit and evidence of
the L. C. ~![iles mortgage in July of 1953 and the Farmers
State Bank judgment on September 25, 1953, even in
view of the fact that these were obligations against the
corporation at the time of the stock transaction between
the parties to this suit.
The plaintiff ignores the fact that under 25-1-2,
UCA 1953, Esmeier's interest in the corporation was
equally attributable to payment of the notes sued on as
was Lambeth's and the entire interest purchased by the
agreements of January 6, and February 18, 1953, is subject to the notes, which makes the plaintiff a creditor and
the entire interest is to be computed in determining Lan1beth's solvency, rather than a one-half interest, as indicated by the plaintiff's brief at page 26. The plaintiff,
on the question of solvency, also fails to consider that the
deeds and bill of sale were executed on August 1, 1950
(R. 87) and delivered in the summer of 1952 (R. 87).
In the final analysis at the time of recording the
deeds in May, 1953, defendants Esmeier and Lambeth
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held a 1980/2000 interest in assets rated by the plaintiff
and by Bertrand Givan, plaintiff's witness and initial
payee on two of the notes sued on, as having a value in
excess of $130,000.00, against which there were liabilities
in the sum of $57,850.00 as set forth by the agreement
between the parties, which leaves after the deduction
of the $16,000.00 cash payment acknowledged by the
agreement a minin1um of $72,150.00 worth of assets to
secure $34,500 worth of notes for which the plaintiff held
recourse to the 1980 shares of stock.
Plaintiff contends that the question of the defendant
Lambeth's solvency on December 5, 1953 should be controlling and that the court erred in making no finding
thereon (plaintiff's brief 23). All the sections of Utah's
Fraudulent Conveyance Act so frequently cited by the
plaintiff contemplate solvency as defined by 25-1-2, UGA.
1953, and relate to the financial condition of the transferor at the time of the alleged fraudulent conveyance
or conveyances. The latest date that the court could find
that the transfers in issue took place was the recording
date of J\i[ay 18, 1953, and Lambeth ~s assets at that time
consisted of a joint interest with Es1neier of virtually
all the stock in a corporation that by the plaintiff's own
testimony had assets worth in exeess of $1-±3,000.00 (R.
137 -139) a short three Inonths before and which had
obligations of $57,850.00. There is no evidence to show
a diminution in the value as of 1\lay lS, 1953 at any place
in the record.
La1nbeth could no more conteinplate that the present
fair salable value of his assets was less than the a1nount
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required to pay his existing liabilities as they became
absolute and final (see 25-1-2, UCA 1953) on May 18,
1953 than he could when he paid the plaintiff and his
brother $16,000.00 on February 18th of the same year,
only ninety days before. There is no evidence that the
fa~r salable value. of the assets was less in May 1953 than
in February 1953 and the only evidence of the value in
February is that of the plaintiff and the plaintiff's
brother Bertrand, both of whom were parties to the sale
of stock and each a payee of the notes upon which this
suit was originally instituted.
(b) THERE IS A WEALTH OF EVIDENCE OF CONSIDERA'TION FOR THE TRANSFER OF THE REAL ESTATE AND SHEEP OPERATION REPRESENTED BY EXHIBITS 7, 8, 9 AND 10.

In its Findings of Fact, the trial court found that
(a) Lambeth was not insolvent at the time of the
conveyance of the property, both real and chattel by
deeds Exhibits 7, 8, and 9, and bill of sale Exhibit 10
(Findings 15, 16, 17, and 18, R. 90-91). (b) There
was consideration for the transfer (R. 88). (c) He was
not indebted except for debts secured by mortgages
on the transferred property at either the time of execution of the documents or at the time of delivery of the
documents (Findings 6 and 7, R. 88).
Our Fraudulent Conveyance Act, Title 25, Chapter
1, UCA 1953, makes a voluntary conveyance fraudulent
only when:
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1. It makes the transferor insolvent as set forth in
25-1-2, UCA 1953.
2. When the transferor is about to engage In a
business with an unreasonably small capital.
3. When he intends to or believes that he will incur
debts beyond his ability to pay (25-1-6, UCA 1953).
4. To hinder, delay, or defraud creditors (25-1-7,
UCA 1953) with claims either matured or not matured.
If the transfer is not voluntary but is for a fair
consideration (25-1-3) the transfer is not fraudulent, even
though misfortune or bad business judgment makes the
transferor insolvent shortly thereafter unless there is
an express showing that the transfer was a mere device
to create a trust for the transferor with the intent to defraud future creditors.
In the present suit the plaintiff in order to prevail
must establish that the transfer of the real and personal
property conveyed to the sons by Frank Lambeth rendered him insolvent at the time of the transfer, whether
that be on delivery of the deeds and bill of sale in the
su1runer of 1952 or on the date of recordation, ~Ia:~ 18,
1953. In addition to such insolYency, the plaintiff 1nust
overcome the trial court's finding of fair consideration.
Overcoming one finding without overconring the other
is insufficient in the absence of a showing of actual
fraudulent intent and the evidence supporting each finding serves to negative any such intent.
In discussing the consideration for the transfers, the
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whole of the evidence shows that the father was not only
indebted to the four sons for years of work during their
majority for which they were never fully paid, but goes
above and beyond a fair consideration to the point that
it is apparent without the labor of the sons the chattel
property and the grazing land would have never been
accumulated (see Lambeth's testimony, T. 192).
Q.

In 1950, what would you say was the fair
market value~

A.

Excuse me, Keith, what year did we get the
Dr. McCormick place~

The boys worked with the father in acquiring the sheep,
camp equipment, and land, and at least two of the boys,
Thallo and Keith, had passed their majority at the inception of the business in 1934.
The bill of sale itself, Exhibit 10, sets forth the consideration of $1.00 "and in consideration of the continual
labor and help they have given without pay."
It is apparent from the instruments themselves that
the property was transferred and received for the consideration of work and labor done. Had the transfers
been in the nature of a testamentary disposition or a gift
as maintained by the plaintiff, Lambeth's three daughters would have undoubtedly shared equally with their
brothers rather than being granted a one-seventh undivided interest in a piece of property valued at $600.00
to $700.00, with no interest whatsoever in the range land,
house, or sheep operation.
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Before a detennination as to fair consideration for
the sheep operation and the land may be made, there
1nust be a basis for determining the value of the land
and chattels. The only guide to such value is in the testiInony of Frank Lambeth at T. 193 et seq. vVith regard
to the value in 1950, Lambeth testified that the range
land was probably worth $15.00 an acre. The deeds
show approximately 1,000 acres or $15,000.00, the sheep
value $24,000.00 for the 1600 head (T. 193), horses and
equipment $2,500.00 (T. 194), thus making a total of
$41,500.00.
He testified that the value would be lower iii 1953
(T. 194). There was on the sheep, equipment and range
land a Inortgage to the Bank of Southern r tah in the
sum of $31,000.00 (T. 195). In addition to the sheep and
range land, there ·was the horne in Cedar City valued
variously at $14,000.00 ( T. 192) and $18,000.00 ( T. 193)
and three and one-half acres of farm ground in Iron
County valued at $200.00 per acre or $600.00 to $700.00
for the entire piece (T. 19:2) .....~fter deducting the $31,000.00 note and n1ortgage to the Bank of Southern Utah,
there would be left a Inaxilnurn value of about $25,000.00
deeded to the four boys, not taking into consideration
the one-seventh interest each, held by the three girls in
the farm ground.
There is no other basis of valuation of the property
in the evidence produced at the trial.
As to the consideration that the boys had worked on
the sheep operation without drawing regular wages since
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the year 1934, we agree with the plaintiff's statement
that a parent is entitled to the labors of his minor children without consideration. However, the evidence
shows at the time of trial that rr,hallo Lambeth was 49
years old, Keith 47, Ellis 43, and Aubra 37 (T. 181).
Therefore, Lambeth had not been entitled to Thallo's
labor since 1930, Keith's since 1932, Ellis' since 1937, and
Aubra's since 1942. Up to 1950, when the deeds were
executed, the labor and assistance in the business for
"'\vhich the boys were not ever fully paid consisted of 16
years for Thallo and Keith, 13 years for Ellis, and 8
years for Aubra that were not a matter of right in Frank
Lambeth under the law. Of course, at the time the deeds
were delivered ~ 1952, there would be an additional 2
years for each of the four boys.
Frank Lambeth testified as to the work of the boys
since 1934. Keith, Ellis, and Aubra testified as to their
work and the basis of their pay and all four testified as
to the services of Thallo, who was with the sheep at the
time of trial (T. 401-502). The court found after consideration of all the testimony, together with the documents entered as set forth in Finding No. 8 (R. 88) :
"That Frank Lambeth's sons had rendered
services in assisting him in operating said sheep
and grazing land during a period of more than
twenty years prior to 1952 and had not drawn full
wages for such services, but had worked with the
expectancy of receiving an interest in the property
when Frank Lambeth had retired or died. That
evidence does not show even approximately the
amount earned or the amount received by said
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sons from said sheep operation, but it appear3
that each of them, and particularly Keith, had
earned much more than they received from the
sheep operation."
This finding is fully supported by the evidence and
is sufficient to support a basis of fair consideration.
(c) THE
TRANSFER BEING PRIOR TO THE
TIME THE GIVANS BECAME CREDITORS OF LAMBETH,
A SHOWING OF A·CTUAL INTENT TO DEFRAUD IS NECESSARY WHETHER THE TRANSFER WAS FOR FAIR
CONSIDERATION OR, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS VOLUNTARY.

The only evidence with regard to manual deliverv
of the deeds shows the deeds were delivered unconditionally by Frank Lambeth to Keith Lambeth during the
summer of 1952. Keith places the date of delivery as
July, 1952. The court, in its findings (R. 88) following
the special interrogatories of the advisory jury, finds
the delivery to be in August or Septe1nber. There is no
evidence whatsoever refuting this n1anual delivery.
There is, further, no evidence to show that Frank
Lambeth was insolvent at the time of tllis transfer nor
that he contemplated becon1ing a creditor of the Givans.
Title 25, Chapter I, UCA 1953, 1nakes it apparent that
a voluntary transfer is effective and not fraudulent if it
does not make the grantor insolvent or is not to defraud
1natured or unmatured creditors nor is a de,ice contemplated to hinder or delay such creditors. La1ubeth did
not becmne a creditor of the Givans until February lS,
1953, and at that time by the Givan brothers' own stateInent as to the value of the assets of GiYans, Inc., beca1ne
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the holder of sufficient assets at their then salable value
to meet his existing obligations as they became due and
payable. What can be better evidence of the value of
assets than the statement of the adverse party or parties
to a lawsuit regarding the sale of those assets~ It must
be concluded that under the circumstances, as shown by
all the evidence in this case, there 1nust be a showing
of actual intent to defraud at the time of conveyance to
hold these conveyances to be fraudulent even were this
court to reverse the lower court on its finding that the
transfers were for consideration and not voluntary. True,
in the Ogden State Bank case, 12 Utah 13, 40 Pac. 765, the
court's decision arose from evidence that a voluntary
conveyance rendered the defendant insolvent and went
on a doctrine of constructive fraud as to existing creditors. In the present case, the court found Frank Lambeth
to be solvent at all times material to the question of
transfer of the property and also found the transfers
to be for consideration rather than voluntary. Plaintiff
also relies upon the case of Gustin v. Mathews, 25 Utah
168, 70 Pac. 402. It is interesting to note that the case
was a husband-wife situation, and this court does not and
has never considered the parent-child relationship in the
same nature as that of the husband and wife relationship.
With reference to the above statement, we quote from
Judge Wolfe's dissenting opinion in Lund v Howell, 92
Utah 232, 67 P. (2d) 215, at page 219 of the Pacific
citation:
"A husband and wife embark on the voyage
of life together, expecting to meet the waves to-
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gether, devoting to the support of themselves and
children, and to his success, their common efforts
and their several means. She is always willing,
from affection for her husband and interest in his
success, to extend him the help of her means, his
business interests being in a large sense her interests, she never expecting any return of the means
she commits to his hands; and if, after he has had
those means employed in his business for years,
mingled indiscriminately with his, it were permitted her, when misfortune overtakes him, to
raise up loans to the prejudice of his creditors,
and support them by his own and her evidence,
after creditors had trusted him in total ignorance
of such loans, and allow him to use his means in
purchasing real estate in her name, a wide road
would be laid out for the promotion of v.Tong
against honest creditors."
Judge Wolfe, later in his opinion, refers to such conduct
as the wife refuge racket, and plaintiff's counsel would
attempt to name the conveyance here being litigated as a
parent-child refuge racket. However, this is not the case,
the law being explicit here and elsewhere that a child
working for his parent is entitled to the fruits of his
labor after attaining his majority.
(d) 'THE DELIVERY IN THE SUMMER OF 1952 DOES
NOT SHOW AN INTENT ON THE PART OF FRANK LAMBETH TO DIVEST HIMSELF OF HIS PROPERTY IMMEDIATELY BEFORE ENTERING INTO A SUBSTANTIAL
BUSINESS IN WHICH HE CONTEMPLATED CONTRACTING DEBTS BEYOND HIS ABILITY TO PAY.

The trial court found delivery of the deeds and bill
of sale in question by a 1nanual transfer of possession
from Frank Lambeth to l(eith Lambeth, one of the grant-
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ors in the instru1nents. The nature of the delivery itself
is significant. The testimony shows that the deeds had
been in the possession of Frank Lambeth in the smne
house where Keith was living and where Keith had access
to the deeds. However, this was not sufficient in the
mind of Frank Lambeth and the evidence shows that he
handed the deeds to Keith to be kept at such place as
l{eith desired to keep them and entirely out of the control
of Frank Lan1beth, and the act of the grantor in giving
of the deeds and the grantees in the acceptance of the
deeds by Keith Lambeth excluding the control and possession of Frank Lambeth is adequate evidence as to the
intent of the parties. This court set forth in Stanley v.
Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P (2d) 465, the following language at headnote 5:
" 'Delivery' of a deed is essentially -a matter
of intent which intent is to be arrived at from all
facts and surrounding circumstances."
The lower court found that a delivery had been made.
This court also in the Stanley case, at page 466 of the
Pacific citation, quoting Olivero v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 475,
:214 Pac. 313, 315, and cases cited thereunder, as follows:
"The scope of the review on appeal in equity
cases is clearly settled in this jurisdiction. 'This
court is authorized by the state Constitution to
review the findings of the trial courts in equity
cases, but the findings of the trial courts on conflicting evidence will not be set aside unless it
1nanifestly appears that the court has misapplied
proven facts or made findings clearly against the
weight of the evidence.' "
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The plaintiff attempts to tie in the contract between Esmeier, Lambeth and the Givans dated in October, 1952,
as purporting to show that Lambeth made the transfer
in the belief that he would incur debts beyond his ability
to pay as they matured, as provided by Section 25-1-6,
UCA 1953, and further, that Lambeth finally did in
February, 1953, enter into a business transaction which
on its face appears to be for the purchase of stock from
the Givan brothers, with the payment of $16,000.00 on a
$50,400.00 obligation, plaintiff contending this is an unreasonably small capital. However, the evidence as a
whole would indicate that the $16,000.00 paid is roughly
331;3% of the purchase price of the stock purchased, and
was not business capital for the operation of Givans, Inc.,
but was paid to the Givan brothers for the purchase of
stock. It is also important to note that the Givan brothers
secured their notes for the other $34,500.00 on the stock
purchased not by a mortgage of real property or a
chattel mortgage of chattel property, but expressly by
holding recourse to the stock purchased.
(e)

BADGES OF FRAUD.

As the plaintiff points out in his citation fro1n 37
C.J.S., page 922, the so-called "badges of fraud" a1nount
to little more than suspicious circlnnstances. It would
seem that there is not a suit alleging a fraudulent conveyance in this or any other jurisdiction in which some
of the so-called badges of fraud are not contended by the
plaintiffs. However, the crux of a fraudulent conveyance
suit must depend upon a e01nbination of insolYency of
the transferor caused by a transfer of property. and
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lack of a fair consideration for such transfer. In the
event of fair consideration or a failure to prove insolvency, there can be no fraud against creditors, and such
so-called badges of fraud as may arise create an inference that is readily overcome by the evidence of fair
consideration and solvency.
True, there are certain inconsistencies pointed out
by the plaintiff in the testimony of Frank Lambeth but,
read as a whole, the testimony is straightforward and
not inherently improbable. Such inconsistencies arise at
any time when a seventy-five year old man is kept on the
stand by a clever attorney through approximately half of
518 pages of transcript, especially when all the incidents
testified to are at least four years in the past and many
of them going back eight, ten, and fifteen years, and as
the Oregon Supreme Court stated in its discussion of the
badges of fraud in the American Surety Company of
Xezc York vs. Hattrem, 3 P.(2d) 1109:
"The learned trial judge, who heard the witnesses and saw their dmneanor upon the stand,
was in a better position to judge of the strenuou~
effort made, if any, to color the testimony, and
was in a better position to pass upon the goon
faith of ~1:rs. Hattrem than is this court."
(f and g) THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTION THAT FRANK LAMBETH RETAINED THE LAND OR GOODS IN HIS POSSESSION OR
UNDER HIS CONTROL.

All the evidence by all parties indicates that Frank
Lambeth did very little work regarding the sheep oufit
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after 1947, and that subsequent to 1950, he did practically
no work. Even the testimony of the plaintiff and his
brother indicates that during the period when the Givans,
Inc. garage was on the South Main Street property close
to the Lambeth home, which is one of the pieces of
property in controversy, that the Givan boys saw Frank
Lambeth almost daily, see the testimony of Edwin Givan
(T. 386-387).

Q. With reference to your knowledge of Mr.
Lambeth's business, you were aware of ·where
Mr. Lambeth lived, were you not~
A.

I was.

Q.

That was very close to your place of business?

A.

Yes.

Q. Did you see Mr. Lambeth
A. Very frequently, yes.

frequently~

Q. Almost every day when you were in
A.

town~

That is correct.

This serves to show that 1\lr. Lambeth was not in possession of sheep or sheep equipment, but was living in
town, which was known to the Givans and w·as seeing th~
Givans almost every day. La1nbeth's testin1ony was to
the effect that he had not been on the Kane County property for some time and had not done work thereon for
years. The possession of the home by La1nbeth was not
exclusive, the Givan boys being aware as 'vas the rest
of the com1nunity, that l{eith was living there with his
wife and fa1nily and Thallo lived there when not "·ith
the herd.
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The jury, in its advisory capacity, after listening to
all the evidence found in the special interrogatories with
respect to the deeds evidenced by Exhibits 7, three and
one-half acres of farm land (R. 81, paragraphs hand i).
Exhibit 8, the Kane County grazing land (R. 82, paragraphs h, i, and j), and the bill of sale, Exhibit 10 (R. 84,
paragraphs h and i) that Frank Lambeth in August,
1952, delivered possession with the intention of passing
title and ownership at that time and without any retention
of rights in the control, use, or benefit of the property.
The jury found with respect to Exhibit 9, the deed for
the house and lot in Cedar City (R. 83, paragraph hand
i) that Frank Lambeth in 1952 transferred that property
with the intention of passing title and ownership, with
the understanding that he had a right to reside there
(R. 83, paragraphs hand i).
The trial court, after hearing the same evidence
heard by the jury, and having considered certain other
evidence relating to the solvency of Lambeth which was
withheld from the jury and having been advised by the
jury's answers to the interrogatories, made findings consistent with those interrogatories, though not in any way
bound to do so. It is also noteworthy that each of the
interrogatories answered by the jury was a unanimous
finding (R. 81, 82, 83, and 84), indicating that all person'S
involved, to wit, the judge and the eight jurors who heard
the evidence and examined the exhibits and were in the
best position to determine the credibility of the witnesses,
made the same findings with respect to the questions of
delivery, retention of possession, and intent to defraud.
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Considering that these nine persons were able to see and
hear the witnesses and were consistent in their findings
showing an absence of fraud, great weigth should be given
thereto by the reviewing court. That the appellate court
may review the evidence as well as the law in an equity
proceeding is conceded, but the cases are legion holding
that the appellate court must affirm unless the findings
of the trial court are clearly erroneous, see Olivero v.
Eleganti, supra, also Hall v. Hall, 7 Utah 2d 413, where as
late as June, 1958, this court held:
"In an equity case the Supreme Court must
affirm unless the trial court's conclusion is obv?ously against the evidence."
The plaintiff cites Clark v. Porter, 68 P. (2d) 8±-1, an
Oklahoma case, as authority for his vie·w on possession.
It should be noted that that case is based on a statute
requiring a change of possession and not a change of
ownership, and is not applicable here. The plaintiff further cites Anderson v. Cou,rtney, 218 P. (2d) 261, another
Oklahoma case involving the validity of a transfer of
personal property between a first transferee and a subsequent purchaser of the same property, and involYe~
the question of necessity of possession as related to subsequent purchasers and not to the rights of creditors.
(h) THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE
·CREATION OF A TRUST FOR FRANK LAMBETH.

The cases cited by the plaintiff under this point. two
California cases and a l{ansas case. correctly state the
law with regard to situations where there is an atten1pt
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to pass nominal title to property in an obvious attempt
to defeat the demands of creditors. The evidence herein
discussed by both plaintiff's and defendants' briefs in
Points 1 and 2 clearly indicates that the property herein
involved was transferred for a valuable consideration
and during a period while the transferor was solvent,
and therefore, does not create a trust in fraud of creditors.
POINTS 2. and 3.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7 OF THE JUDGMENT.

The trial court entered its findings, conclusions and
judgment after consideration of all the evidence, both
testamentary and documentary.
The 518 pages of transcript hold a wealth of evidence
to sustain the findings and the findings are sufficient
to support the judgment. In addition to the testamentary
evidence, the deeds themselves, and particularly the bill
of sale of the sheep and equipment, together with the
testimony as to date of delivery and the years of work
and labor without pay amply support the findings and
conclusions and paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgment
of the trial court.
POINTS 4, 5, and 6.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUSTAINING DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION 'TO PROFFERED EXHIBITS 13, 14, 15,
AND THE DEPOSITION OF THE WITNESS SCOVILLE.

Plaintiff contends that the court erred in refusing to
admit certain evidence proffered as Exhibits 13, 14, and
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15, and deposition of one Scoville, as agent of the Pacific
Finance Company.
Exhibit 13 is a note and mortgage to Pacific Finance
Company by Givans, Inc., dated May 14, 1953 which
states on its face that it was for "value received." The
court sustained defendants' objection to the exhibit on
the ground that the mortgage was given to secure a
note for consideration obtained at that time and would
make no difference in the assets of Frank Lambeth.
Plaintiff contends that the mortgage was given to secure
an indebtedness incurred by financing cars sold by
Esmeier (plaintiff's brief 65). There is no evidence to
support this statement by the plaintiff and the exhibit
was properly rejected.
Exhibit 14 is a mortgage given by Givans, Inc. to
one L. C. Miles on July 1, 1953 and is on its face and by
plaintiff's admission a renewal of the $5,000.00 obligation
to Miles that is set forth in the original stock purchase
agreement between the parties on January 6, 1953. It is,
therefore, of no probative value with regard to a change
of financial condition of Givans, Inc. between February
18, 1953 and May 18, 1953.
Exhibit 15 consists of certain pleadings, stipulations
and related papers in a suit in which none of the parties
to the present suit were parties. The court's sustaining
the objection to the admission of Exhibits 15 a through
h was entirely proper (T. 22-1).
The deposition of Richard B. Scoville was partially
read into the record (T. 373-376), whereupon the court
sustained an objection so far as allowing the reading of
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the deposition before the jury, but received the deposition for consideration of the court (T. 377). Again, at
the risk of repetition, we must point out that the final
determination of this matter was for the court and not
the jury, and that the court Inust be presumed to have
fully considered such deposition.
POINT 7.
THERE IS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S F AlLURE TO
ADMIT FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE JURY EVIDENCE CONSISTING OF THE LAMBETHS' CHECKING
ACCOUNT FROM JUNE 1952 TO AND INCLUDING AUGUST
1953.

This case being a matter in equity, the jury sat only
m an advisory capacity and the court was not bound
by the findings of the jury. The parties stipulated that
the checks could be considered for all issues to be determined by the court (R. 463-464).
The case being equitable, all issues were for the determination of the court, the court being at liberty to
accept or deny any or all advisory interrogatories answered by the jury.
POINT 8.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
:.IOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.

The case being equitable and for the determination
of the court, and the jury's findings being advisory in
nature only and not in any way binding on the court, the
court's denial of the motion for directed verdict by the
plaintiff as well as the motion for directed verdict by the
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defendants was immaterial and consisted of nothing more
than the court's taking the case under advisement.
GENERAL DISCUSSION REGARDING THE LA \r
The plaintiff, in his discussion regarding all points
beginning on page 67 of paintiff's brief, cites certain
cases and comments thereon, and we feel it necessary to
distinguish and differentiate certain of those cases and
to set forth further authority.
The case of Randall v. Tracy-Collins Trust Co., G
Utah 2d 18, 305 P (2d) 480, is a suit for specific performance of an oral contract. This court affirmed on the
basis that the evidence was not so vague and uncertain
that the finding of the trial court was erroneous.
Both Adams v. Silver Shield J!ining and Jlilling
Company and Gustin v. llfathews, cited by the plaintiff,
were cases where the transfers were voluntary and the
transfers also made the transferor insolvent. Zuniga Y.
Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P. (2d) 513, involved a transfer
from the father to daughters while an action for dmnages
was pending, the deeds were not recorded until eight
days prior to filing of the judg1nent in that action. In
that case, the trial court found the transfer to be fraudulent due to lack of a fair consideration and due to insolvency of the defendant caused by the transfer. The
appellate court held consistent with fonner holdings of
the Supreme Court that the trial court was to be upheld
unless the weight of the evidence was against the trial
court's finding. The Supre1ne Court affinned the trial
court's finding.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
In the plaintiff's citation of American Surety Company of New York v. H attrem, supra, plaintiff makes his
own paraphrasing (see page 72 of plaintiff's brief) of a
purported simile arising between a conveyance frorn
husband to wife and, on the other hand, a conveyance
from parent to children. This comparison is not warranted by the law.
The American Surety case is also interesting with
regard to the discussion of "badges of fraud," and that
court states at page 1111 of the Pacific citation:
"The learned trial judge, who heard the witnesses and saw their demeanor upon the stand,
\vas in a better position to judge of the strenuous
effort made, if any, to color the testimony, and
was in a better position to pass upon the good
faith of nirs. Hattrem than is this court."
Again the appellate court affirmed the trial court.
Similarly, the trial judge in the present case was in
a better position to pass on the good faith of the defendants in this action, both the transferor and the transferees. Also, he was supported by the unani1nous advisory
answers to interrogatories by a jury which also heard
the testimony and was able to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses upon the stand, and such answers are
consistent with the findings of the trial court.
In Ogden State Bank v. Barker, supra, again the
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
In Stanley v. Stanley, supra, cited by plaintiff at pag~
46, the trial court found from the facts before it that
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there had been no delivery of a deed in evidence between
a husband and wife, there being a wealth of evidence that
the grantor had remained in possession and control of the
premises deeded for a period of twenty-one years after
execution of the deed. This court affirmed the findings
of the trial court under the long-established rule that
in equity cases the reviewing court should not overturn
the judgment of the trial court unless the trial court's
findings are clearly erroneous.

Smith v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17 P. (2d) 264, cited
by plaintiff at 1270, is one of the few cases found by
either plaintiff or defendant where the Supreme Court
reversed the trial court, and in that case found the error
to be in the trial court's findings from the evidence that
the conveyances were fraudulent. The Supreme Cou.rt
reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the
action.
Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540, 15 P (2d) 1051, cited
by the plaintiff at page 80, again affirms the general
rule that the trial court's findings should not be disturbed unless clearly wrong. In that case, the Supreme
Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, that case
being a question of mortgage foreclosure rather than
a direct conveyance.
In Webster v. Peterson, -!6 P. (2d) 676, the trial court
found a nwrtgage given by a husband to a wife covering
his undivided one-half joint interest in a farn1 to be
in fraud of creditors, the trial court having found that
the note and mortgage were given to defraud the plain-
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tiff and prevent hi1n from collecting the amount due on
his judgment. The defense was that the mortgage was for
a valuable consideration and not fraudulent. In a discussion of headnote 5 thereof, the Supreme Court holds
that the recitation of valuable consideration on a note is
written evidence of a debt then created and thereafter
existing and owing. This case is important both due to
the Supreme Court's reversal of the trial court in finding
the Inortgage not to be fraudulent in spite of the husband
and wife relationship, but also with regard to the plaintiff's points 4, 5, and 6 regarding a similar note and mortgage from Pacific Finance to Givans, Inc. also reciting
on its face a valuable consideration.
Referring again to the Stanley v. Stanley case, cited
supra, Judge Wolfe in his concurring opinion cites a
great number of cases, including the majority of cases
cited by both plaintiff and defendant in this action, many
of those cases referring directly to fraudulent conveyance
actions and all regarding the findings and opinions of the
trial judge when considered by an appellate court in an
appeal from an equitable action. Justice Wolfe in that
concurring opinion collects many of the cases by this
court and all those cases indicate that the opinion of the
trial judge must be considered to the point that even
though there be a preponderance of evidence against the
trial court's conclusions, the appellate court should affirm.
The appellant and plaintiff points out at pages 20
and 21 of his brief, citing from 37 C.J.S., Section I, page
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852, that "creditors are a favored class and preservation
of their rights is a fundamental policy in law."
Purchasers for value are also to be protected by the
law, and a conveyance is not to be found fraudulent as to
creditors and therefore invalid unless there is both :1
voluntary conveyance and a conveyance creating or tending to create willful insolvency. In this case there is
neither.
CONCLUSION
From a voluminous record, including four days of
trial with regard to the fraudulent conveyance part of
this suit following two days of trial on the portion ?f
the suit as to the validity of the notes, and after taking
the matter under advisen1ent to review the documentary
evidence submitted, being fully cognizant of the advisory
interrogatories answered by the jury, the learned trial
court found that the three deeds and the bill of sale alleged to be fraudulent were valid, were delivered for a
valuable consideration, and were delivered and recorded
while Frank Lambeth, the transferor, was solvent. The
court had an1ple opportunity through several days of
trial to observe the demeanor and detennine the credibility of the transferor and three of the principal transferees. In fact, the transferor Lmnbeth was on the stand
for the greatest part of two days in the last portion of
the hearing. The trial court had mnple opportunity to
determine his good faith in the transaction and lack of
intent to defraud. The testinwn~- of all the defendants
testifying, wlwn considered as a whole, is consistent and
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impressive.
Plaintiff argues that Lambeth and
Esmeier, with reference to the assets of Givans, Inc.,
''reaped all the benefits from the disposition of the assets
until Lundgren foreclosed his mortgage." There is no
evidence as to the disposition of the assets and the evidence affirmatively shows that Lambeth, the transferor,
never took anything from the corporation. Plaintiff
characterizes the transfers of property from the father,
Frank Lambeth, to the sons as a father-children racket
when there is no evidence to show either lack of consideration for the transfers or the insolvency of the transferor at the time of the transfers, or an intent upon the
part of the transferor or transferees to defraud the plaintiff or the other persons on the notes given by Esmeier
and Lambeth to the plaintiff, his brother Bertrand, and
their wives. The cases cited both by the plaintiff in his
able brief and by the defendant are consistent in holding
that though the Supreme Court may review the evidence
as well as the law in a proceeding of this nature, the
opinion and findings of the trial judge, due to his more
advantageous position in being able to view the demeanor
and candor of the witnesses on the stand, must carry
great weight, and that the Supreme Court must affirm
unless it appears that the findings of the trial court were
obviously in error. The voluminous record in this trial
has been well stripped by the plaintiff in his lengthy
brief in excerpting portions of testimony from the 518
pages of transcript of testimony, the large sheaf of exhibits, and the numerous pleadings, but the evidence considered as a whole is fully sufficient to support all find-
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ings and conclusions of the trial court and to support the
trial court's decision in refusing the admission of certain
exhibits proffered by the plaintiff. The trial court had
for its consideration answers to interrogatories by a
jury sitting for the purpose of advising the trial court
as to certain findings of fact, and the eight jurors were
unanimous in their findings, which findings are consistent with the views of the trial court.
Therefore, it is insisted that the findings, conclusions
and decree were correct and in fact were the only equitable determination of the issues in this proceeding, and
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
SUMNER J. HATCH
Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents
409 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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